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Abstract—The paper discusses the need for a fully-distributed
selfishness detection mechanism dedicated for multihop wire-
less ad hoc networks which nodes may exhibit selfish forward-
ing behavior. The main contribution of this paper is an in-
troduction to a novel approach for detecting and coping with
the selfish nodes. Paper describes a new framework based
on Dempster-Shafer theory-based selfishness detection frame-
work (DST-SDF) with some mathematical background and
simulation analysis.
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1. Introduction
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) and ad hoc wireless
sensor networks (WSNs) are collections of mobile nodes
that exchange packets over a wireless transmission medium.
There may be pairs of nodes out of each other’s recep-
tion range, for which the only way of exchanging data is
via in-range nodes acting as packet forwarders, i.e., agree-
ing to relay packets on behalf of other nodes. However,
packet forwarding costs extra energy and bandwidth, each
being a scarce resource in wireless ad hoc devices. Ra-
tional nodes try to save energy and bandwidth as much as
possible, and the most obvious way of doing it is by re-
fusing to relay packets. Such non-cooperative behavior is
usually called selfish. Without a mechanism preventing it,
MANETs and/or ad hoc WSNs become unreliable. Selﬁsh-
ness is to be distinguished from malicious behavior, a type
of non-cooperative behavior that brings no tangible beneﬁt
to the perpetrators.
Prevention, detection and/or mitigation of selﬁshness,
as well as enforcement of cooperative behavior among
MANET or WSN nodes have recently received consider-
able attention. Currently there are a large number of solu-
tions addressing these goals. A promising class of solutions
are reputation-based systems, where the cooperation goals
are achieved by way of determination and sharing reputa-
tion values among all the network nodes or within groups
thereof.
In this work we propose a new approach for detection of
non-cooperative (selﬁsh) behavior in the wireless mobile
ad hoc networks. The solution is a framework which can
be used by the reputation-based systems to detect selﬁsh-
ness. It can replace standard, very often faulty selﬁsh-
ness detection mechanisms (e.g., based on the well-known
watchdog mechanism). Because our framework is based
on Dempster-Shafer theory (DST) [1]–[4] we call it
Dempster-Shafer theory-based selﬁshness detection frame-
work (DST-SDF).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 dis-
cusses related work and outlines some of the well-known
methods of selﬁshness evaluation. Section 3 describes the
general concept of our approach, Section 4 contains a brief
introduction to Dempster-Shafer theory and the methods of
evidence combinations with uncertain information. Sec-
tion 5 describes DST-SDF in more detail. Sample perfor-
mance evaluation results are reported in Section 6. Finally,
Section 7 states conclusions and outlines future work.
2. Related Work
Enforcement of cooperative behavior in MANETs has been
the subject of a number of works. Basically, two types of
solutions dealing with non-cooperative (malicious as well
as selﬁsh) nodes are being proposed. The ﬁst type are
schemes based on virtual currency, e.g., Nuglets [5] or
Sprite [6], that use a form of micropayments to build in-
centives for cooperation. These are usually quite complex
and hard to implement in real networks, typically require
tamper-proof hardware in each node or a trusted third party
to ensure transaction security.
More promising type of solutions are reputation-based
schemes. The most popular ones include coopera-
tion of nodes fairness in dynamic ad hoc networks
(CONFIDANT) [7], collaborative reputation mechanism
(CORE) [8], secure and objective reputation-based in-
centive scheme (SORI) [9], observation-based coopera-
tion enforcement in ad hoc networks (OCEAN) [10] and
reputation-based mechanism for isolating selﬁsh nodes in
ad hoc networks [11], locally aware reputation system
(LARS) [12].
The concepts of all of the above reputation-based systems
are very similar. The key functional aspects they all share
are as follows. Each network node:
– gathers information about the other nodes’ behavior;
– calculates reputation values associated with each
other node based on direct behavioral information
and possibly additional indirect information (in the
form of recommendations) received from third-party
nodes;
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– shares evaluated reputation values or direct behav-
ioral information with all the other nodes (in the case
of global reputation systems) or within the immediate
neighborhood (in the case local reputation systems);
– tries to enforce cooperative behavior of the other
ones by introducing diﬀerent kinds of punishment
(e.g., isolation of non-cooperative nodes from the
network);
– excludes nodes it considers non-cooperative from
paths used by the packets it forwards taking advan-
tage of standard route selection processes.
Currently existing reputation systems have a number of
drawbacks, which our solution aims at overcoming, and
which can be summarized as follows:
• Lack of reliable non-cooperative behavior detec-
tion mechanisms. Gathering information about the
other nodes’ behavior involves additional external
mechanisms. All of the above mentioned reputation-
based solutions (besides the one described in [11])
use the watchdog mechanism for this purpose. There-
fore each network node is obliged to promiscuously
overhear transmissions by its neighbors to determine
their cooperative or non-cooperative behavior. It is
commonly recognized that watchdog is a faulty tool
by nature. Obviously there are other approaches of
non-cooperative behavior detection like in [11], but
there are persistent problems with distinguishing real
from apparent non-cooperative behavior.
• Lack of robustness against false indirect behav-
ioral information. Current reputation-based systems
cannot eﬀectively cope with indirect behavioral infor-
mation (recommendations) dictated by ill will, such
as denial of service (DoS) attacks or collusion.
• Ineffective distribution of indirect behavioral in-
formation. Known reputation-based systems intro-
duce signiﬁcant communication overhead related to
the distribution of recommendation messages.
3. Solution Overview
The DST-SDF is dedicated for MANETs based on standard
routing like dynamic source routing (DSR) [13]. The main
concept relies on end-to-end packet acknowledgments in the
following way: every time a source node sends a packet to
a destination node, it waits for a certain predeﬁned time for
an acknowledgement of the packet. If one arrives within
the predeﬁned time, the source node has reason to claim
that all nodes on the path are cooperative (none is selﬁsh).
Otherwise if there are no other indications of faultiness on
the path (e.g., RERR messages), the source node knows
that there are selﬁsh nodes on the path. Whenever an ac-
knowledgment does or does not arrive in time, a special
recommendation message is sent out to inform the other
nodes about the detected situation (selﬁsh or cooperative
behavior on the path, respectively). Every node in the net-
work is equipped with a dedicated component executing
a DST-based algorithm that uses received recommendation
messages to evaluate the selﬁshness of each node. The
resulting values can be used as routing metrics while se-
lecting packets’ routes in the near future. A more detailed
description of the proposed solution is presented further in
Section 5.
The DST-SDF diﬀers from the existing ones in the follow-
ing main respects:
• There is no need to overhear immediate neigh-
bor nodes’ transmissions to detect their cooperative
or non-cooperative behavior – no additional tools
(e.g., watchdogs) to cover this functionality are
needed.
• Communication overhead is signiﬁcantly reduced
through an economy of scale – no recommendation
message pertains to a single node; rather, each one
pertains to a set of nodes, namely a path.
• Determination of nodes’ selﬁshness is based on con-
sistent evidence received both directly (as derived
from the successive packet acknowledgments or lack
thereof) and indirectly via recommendation mes-
sages.
• DST is used to determine selﬁshness.
Further we describe our approach in more detail, but
before we do, we give some introduction to DST and the
methods it uses to combine pieces of uncertain informa-
tion into new information, and give some arguments for
employing the theory as the basis of DST-SDF.
4. Overview of Dempster-Shafer Theory
The Dempster-Shafer theory, developed by A. P. Dempster
and G. Shafer in the 1960s and 1970s [1]–[4], oﬀers an al-
ternative to classical probability as a formal representation
of uncertainty. It is in fact a mathematical theory of evi-
dence based on the so-called belief functions and plausible
reasoning, and may be used to combine separate and inde-
pendent pieces of evidence to quantify the belief in a given
statement, further reﬂected as an evidence value. DST is
a potentially valuable tool for the evaluation of risk and
reliability in engineering applications when it is not pos-
sible to obtain precise measurements from experiments, or
when knowledge is independently elicited from a number
of experts. Instead of giving a thorough exposition of the
mathematical basics of the theory, we only focus on those
of its aspects used in our DST-SDF approach.
Statements in DST are related to some universal set Θ
and take the form of claims that a particular element x of
Θ belongs to a set X ⊆ Θ. Belief in a statement derives
from a DST primitive called basic probability assignment.
It is a function mapping the powerset of Θ onto the inter-
35
Jerzy Konorski and Rafał Orlikowski
val [0, 1] : m : 2Θ → [0, 1], with the normalization constraint
satisﬁed over the entire powerset. That is, with each X ⊆Θ
(i.e., X ∈ 2Θ) is associated a real number m(X) between
0 and 1 that measures the amount of trust we put in the
claim that x ∈ X , and there is no reason to believe that
x ∈ X ′ for any X ′ ⊂ X (i.e., no evidence supports a stronger
statement), with m(∅) = 0, and
∑
X∈2Θ
m(X) = 1 . (1)
Belief, or evidence value, associated with X is then de-
ﬁned as
ev(X) = ∑
X ′∈2Θ|X ′⊆X
m(X ′) , (2)
i.e., is the arithmetic sum of basic probability assignments
to statements at least as strong as the one in question.
As an example, consider a network node that can be des-
ignated as SELFISH or NONSELFISH. Thus we have
the universal set Θ = {SELFISH, NONSELFISH}. As-
suming that there is enough information to claim that the
node is SELFISH with probability 0.1 and NONSELFISH
with probability 0.9, we can write down the following basic
probability assignment:
m(X) =
{
0.1, X = {SELFISH},
0.9, X = {NONSELFISH} . (3)
This resembles classical probability distribution over Θ and
results in the distribution of evidence values identical with
Eq. (3). However, one might just as well assign a basic
probability of 0.9 to not knowing at all whether the node
is SELFISH or NONSELFISH. In that case we get
m(X) =
{
0.1, X = {SELFISH},
0.9, X = {SELFISH, NONSELFISH} , (4)
and the resulting distribution of evidence values becomes
ev({SELFISH})= 0.1 and ev({NONSELFISH})= 0 (note
that they need not sum up to 1).
A useful feature of DST is the formalism to express
the basic probability assignment associated with a subset
of Θ through other basic probability assignments asso-
ciated with subsets of Θ; this enables, e.g., combina-
tion of (possibly conﬂicting) pieces of evidence obtained
from multiple sources into a new piece of evidence in
the course of knowledge updating. Although several evi-
dence combination rules exist, dealing in diﬀerent ways
with conﬂicting evidence, hereafter we stick to a simple one
known as Dempster’s combination rule. Given two pieces
of evidence in the form of basic probability assignments
m1 and m2 over 2Θ, the resulting basic probability assign-
ment for a set X ⊆ Θ is deﬁned as
m(X) = (m1⊕m2)(X) =
∑
Y,Z∈2Θ|Y∩Z=X
m1(Y )m2(Z)
1−C
, (5)
where the factor C represents the total basic probability
mass associated with conﬂicting evidence and is given by
C = ∑
Y,Z∈2Θ|Y∩Z=∅
m1(Y )m2(Z) . (6)
Coming back to our example, let m1 be as in Eq. (4) and
m2(X)=


0, X = {SELFISH},
0.5, X = {NONSELFISH},
0.5, X = {SELFISH, NONSELFISH} ,
(7)
then
(m1⊕m2)({SELFISH})
=
m1({SELFISH})m2({SELFISH, NONSELFISH})
1−m1({SELFISH})m2({NONSELFISH})
=
0.1 ·0.5
1−0.1 ·0.5 ≈ 0.053 . (8)
The main reasons to advocate DST in our framework are
as follows:
• It is able to cope with two kinds of uncertainty that
can be expected in a mobile ad hoc environment:
aleatory uncertainty, resulting from the fact that net-
work nodes can behave in a random way (e.g., per-
form selective or random packet dropping) and epis-
temic uncertainty, resulting from the lack of knowl-
edge about the behavior of other nodes (recall that
there is no direct transmission overhearing mecha-
nism to control nodes’ behavior, such as a watch-
dog, hence, when detecting possible non-cooperative
behavior one has to rely on incomplete informa-
tion based on evidence originating from diﬀerent
sources).
• There are many sources of information on which to
base the evaluation of selﬁshness; as a consequence,
there inevitably arise ambiguities and conﬂicting in-
formation (possibly, but not necessarily due to false
recommendations).
5. The DST-SDF Details
5.1. Assumptions and Implementation
Each time a source node S wishes to send a packet to
a destination node D, a path selection process according
to DSR is performed to determine an appropriate path pS,D
from S to D for the packets. Let us assume that the se-
lected path pS,D consists of the set NS,D of intermediate
nodes, whose cardinality (i.e., the length of pS,D) is LS,D.
As regards routing, the only restriction we place on our
solution is that a source node should know beforehand the
identities of all the intermediate nodes on the path being
selected for any packet (note that on-demand distance vec-
tor routing (AODV)-like protocols are therefore unsuitable
as they do not reveal intermediate nodes to a source node).
Although DST-SDF can cope both with single-path and
multipath routing protocols, to simplify the description we
further assume that MANET nodes only employ a single-
path routing protocol like DSR.
Every network node implements a dedicated component
(Fig. 1) responsible for maintaining information about
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the other nodes’ behavior. We call it the evidence man-
ager component (EMC). Its only task is to detect selﬁsh
nodes based on provided input information of two types:
– direct, i.e., nodes’ own observations (arrival/lack of
arrival of packets’ acknowledgements);
– indirect, i.e., information spread all over the network
in the form of recommendation messages.
The output data of EMC can then be fed into the rout-
ing protocol’s path selection mechanism in a standard way
typical of traditional reputation-based systems.
Fig. 1. Node’s internal dataﬂow diagram.
Inside the EMC, behavioral data for each node are con-
verted to and maintained as evidence values. Current evi-
dence values evaluated by EMC for all the nodes are stored
in an evidence storage component (ESC). When a node
becomes operational (i.e., joins the network) and before it
receives input information (direct or indirect) for the ﬁrst
time, an arbitrary initial basic probability assignment is cre-
ated. Throughout the node’s operational lifetime within the
network, it is updated according to subsequent input events
(i.e., reception of direct or indirect behavioral information
regarding other nodes).
5.2. Direct Information
At the outset, every network node maintains an initial basic
probability assignment regarding all the other nodes:
init mi j(X) =
{
0.5, X = {SELFISH},
0.5, X = {NONSELFISH} , (9)
where init mi j denotes the initial basic probability as-
signment at node i regarding node j’s status (SELFISH,
NONSELFISH, or not known to be SELFISH or NON-
SELFISH). These initial assignments simply tell node i
to consider node j SELFISH and NONSELFISH with
the same uncertainty, by setting the probabilities of these
two designations to 0.5 (node i has no information about
node j). As described earlier, every time a source node S
sends a packet to a destination node D, it waits for an ac-
knowledgment of the packet. If it arrives in time, node S
is certain that all nodes along the selected path pS,D have
behaved cooperatively (there is no selﬁsh node in NS,D).
When the source node S receives in time an acknowl-
edgement for a packet sent over pS,D, it creates the fol-
lowing new basic probability assignments regarding each
node j ∈ NS,D:
init mS j(X) =
{
0, X = {SELFISH},
1, X = {NONSELFISH} , (10)
and updates according to Eq. (5) its basic probability as-
signment:
curr mS j := init mS j ⊕new mS j , (11)
where curr mS j is the current basic probability assignment
at node S regarding node j, and ⊕ denotes Dempster’s
evidence combination operator as in Eq. (5).
If no acknowledgment for the packet arrives within the pre-
deﬁned time, the source station S can only claim that there
are selﬁsh nodes in NS,D. Node S does not know exactly
which one of the nodes in NS,D is SELFISH, it does not
even know how many SELFISH nodes there are, it is just
certain that there is at least one such node. While one can
imagine making any kind of assumptions as to the con-
jectured number of SELFISH nodes in NS,D, our approach
relies on the following simplest assumption: if no acknowl-
edgement for a packet sent over pS,D has arrived in time,
only one SELFISH node is conjectured to be in NS,D. It
is probably appropriate to stress, in view of this somewhat
arbitrary and simplifying assumption, that our approach is
expected to provide eﬃcient detection of selﬁshness in the
ﬁrst place, generality and conceptual elegance being sec-
ondary considerations.
The next simpliﬁcation of ours is taking the classical
Bayesian approach whereby some probabilities can be as-
signed to a concrete node being SELFISH, and ﬁnally re-
stricting our attention to uniform probabilities. That is,
given there is exactly one SELFISH node in NS,D, and
because the source node S has no knowledge as to ex-
actly which node it is, it assumes that all nodes in NS,D
are SELFISH with the same probability P = 1/LS,D (recall
that L is the length of pS,D). The following new basic
probability assignments are then created at node S regard-
ing each node j ∈ NS,D:
new mS j(X)=
{
P, X ={SELFISH},
1−P, X ={SELFISH,NONSELFISH} .
(12)
Node S next updates its initial or (if it already exists) current
basic probability assignments regarding each node j ∈NS,D,
i.e., according to Eq. (11) or to
curr mS j := curr mS j ⊕new mS j . (13)
5.3. Indirect Information
Whenever a packet’s source node receives an acknowledg-
ment for a packet sent over pS,D or observes the prede-
ﬁned time for acknowledgment arrival expired, it spreads
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a recommendation message all over the network. The
message lists the set NS,D and contains an indication of
the respective path’s behavior status that can assume one
of two values: SELFISH (if the acknowledgment has ar-
rived) or NONSELFISH (otherwise). An important point
to note is that unlike in traditional reputation-based systems,
only packets’ source nodes ever spread out recommenda-
tion messages. When a given node i receives from another
node a recommendation message, it builds basic proba-
bility assignments regarding all the nodes listed therein,
i.e., j ∈ NS,D, based on the path behavior indication. If the
path behavior indication is NONSELFISH then
new mi j(X)=
{
u, X ={NONSELFISH},
1−u, X ={SELFISH,NONSELFISH} ,
(14)
whereas if the path behavior indication is SELFISH then
new mi j(X)
=
{
uP, X ={NONSELFISH},
1−(1−u)P, X ={SELFISH,NONSELFISH} .
(15)
The factor u ∈ [0, 1] present in Eqs. (14) and (15) ac-
counts for the possibility that the recommendation mes-
sages can be faked or modiﬁed by malicious intermediate
nodes; it is needed in order to represent uncertainty cre-
ated by recommendation messages and weigh their inﬂu-
ence upon current basic probability assignments. In other
words, u is the value reﬂecting how much trust a recipi-
ent of the recommendation message puts in it. The value
of u can be diﬀerent for each recommendation message
(e.g., depending on its source node). Node i next updates
its initial init m or current curr m (if it already exists)
basic probability assignments regarding all nodes in NS,D
analogously with Eqs. (11) or (13).
Not exactly according to Eq. (2), but in the spirit of DST,
we assume that node j is considered by node i as:
– selﬁsh, if curr mi j({SELFISH})≥ T ,
– nonselﬁsh, if curr mi j({NONSELFISH})≥ T ,
– undeﬁned, if curr mi j({SELFISH}) < T
and curr mi j({NONSELFISH}) < T ,
where T ∈ (0.5, 1] is a selﬁshness threshold. It is very
important to come up with an appropriate T value. Too low
a value contributes to false accusations, whereas too high
one lengthens the time needed to detect selﬁsh nodes and
in the worst case can prevent DST-SDF from determining
nodes’ selﬁshness at all.
6. Simulation
In this section we investigate via simulation the robust-
ness and eﬃciency of the proposed DST-SDF for detec-
tion of node selﬁshness in a mobile ad hoc network. We
try to address the questions how long it takes to detect
all selﬁsh nodes and what is the communication overhead
introduced by DST-SDF. The proposed mechanism is im-
plemented and evaluated using the J-Sim tool [14] in a sim-
ulation environment composed of IEEE 802.11-based ad
hoc networks. The simulated scenario features 100 nodes
arranged on a grid with each node pair’s reception range
conﬁned to one hop. To demonstrate the robustness of
our reputation system, we let 10% of the network nodes
behave selﬁshly, i.e., refuse to forward packets. T is set
to 0.8 and u to 0.9. The DST-SDF eﬃciency is presented
in Fig. 2. Four test scenarios are analyzed with packets’
paths of uniform lengths L.
Fig. 2. Eﬃciency of selﬁshness detection.
The simulations show that in order to detect all selﬁsh
nodes only around 300 packets in total are needed to be
sent by all the network nodes. The selﬁshness detection
process can be divided into two phases. The ﬁrst one cov-
ers the time up to about 90% of detected selﬁsh nodes
and the second one the remaining percentage. Clearly,
the shorter the paths, the higher is the probability P that
a given node along the path whose behavior indication is
SELFISH has behaved selﬁshly. In Eqs. (12) and (15), the
evidence built is stronger than in the case of longer paths
where the probability of selﬁsh behavior is spread among
more nodes. DST-SDF needs less strong evidence (less
certainty) to take a decision in the case of shorter paths.
Conversely, the longer paths, the more uncertain informa-
tion (weaker evidence) DST-SDF is getting and in order to
evaluate selﬁshness it needs more time than it does in the
case of stronger evidence. Nevertheless, the time to detect
90% selﬁsh nodes in our simulation environment turns out
to be largely independent of the path length. This appar-
ent anomaly is due to the particular path selection process
implemented. Our simulation environment only features
end-to-end connections between node pairs at a constant
distance L from each other (L = 1, 5, 8, or 10). Hence,
the shorter the path, the lower the probability that it passes
through a selﬁsh node, and the more paths exist that only
pass through cooperative nodes; consequently, more time
is required to detect all the selﬁsh nodes. At the level
of 90% detected selﬁsh nodes, this eﬀect upon the selﬁsh-
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ness detection time happens to almost precisely compensate
for the diﬀerences in P.
One of the most outstanding issues in all existing indirect
reputation-based systems is the communication overhead
they induce. It also aﬀects DST-SDF as a result of the
dissemination of recommendation messages. Since the en-
visaged future DST-SDF implementation may use acknowl-
edgement mechanisms inherent in higher layers of the open
system interconnection (OSI) reference model, e.g., TCP,
one can argue that ultimately, packets’ acknowledgements
should not be regarded as extra communication overhead.
The total communication overhead induced by DST-SDF
in comparison with a generic theoretical reputation-based
solution (TRBS) that uses indirect behavioral information
is presented in Fig. 3 as a function of the average path
length L. The overhead is expressed as the percentage of
the total number of data packets needed to be sent in order
to discover all the selﬁsh nodes.
Fig. 3. Recommendation messages overhead.
It is easy to notice that longer paths result in a very distinct
advantage of ours over existing reputation systems with re-
spect to the communication overhead. DST-SDF commu-
nication overhead stays steady at the 100% level for diﬀer-
ent L values, meaning that the number of recommendation
messages is equal to the total packets sent. The diﬀerence
between DST-SDF and TRBS stems from the way recom-
mendation messages are generated. In DST-SDF, they can
only originate from packets’ source nodes, while in TRBS
every node (including intermediate nodes on packets’ paths)
can originate recommendation messages. In a watchdog-
based TRBS, each time the watchdog detects a particular
(cooperative or selﬁsh) behavior of an immediate neighbor,
a recommendation message is originated. Moreover, a rec-
ommendation message, whether containing direct or indi-
rect reputation information, typically pertains to just one
node. In DST-SDF, a recommendation message pertains to
the whole path, typically containing more than one node,
and is sent only by the source node according to whether an
acknowledgement for a packet has been received within the
predeﬁned time (positive recommendation) or not (negative
recommendation).
7. Conclusion and Future Work
This paper investigates and presents some aspects of de-
tecting and evaluating selﬁsh node behavior in multihop
mobile ad hoc networks. A novel approach to selﬁshness
detection called DST-SDF has been proposed. Prelimi-
nary simulations show that DST-SDF does allow to detect
fairly quickly all selﬁsh nodes in the network at the cost of
deﬁnitely lower communication overhead compared to tra-
ditional reputation-based systems based on the watchdog
mechanism.
Nevertheless, there are still a number of impediments to be
overcome. In particular, more work needs to be done on:
– robustness against malicious or colluding nodes
(i.e., coping with false accusations or fake positive
recommendations);
– reliability and security of recommendation message
distribution (e.g., assigning proper weights to recom-
mendations);
– proper conﬁguration of DST-SDF (e.g., of the T pa-
rameter) to ensure higher eﬃciency;
– the possibility of combining DST-SDF with protocols
like the anonymous packet forwarding and congestion
control mechanism proposed in a previous paper [15].
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